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Philosophy of Science? 
Foucault vs. Habermas 
by Dean Andrade 
Department of American Studies 
University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee 
Prometheus brought to the world knowledge in the form of fire; 
Lucifer came bearing light in the form of a tempting but lethal apple. The 
Western world, gleefully ignoring the warnings contained in its cultural 
tradition, has since developed a massive technical complex that today 
produces irrevocable innovations at a dizzying rate. Until the twentieth 
century, the West blithely enjoyed the fruits of its scientific labors ... until 
the problem of evil reappeared in the form of global carnage, facilitated 
by technological "advancements." Modem critical discourse has sought 
to rouse humanity against threats to its safety and health, yet has done 
more to analyze and debate problems than fashion possible solutions. 
The problems are not minor. Certainty is impossible, knowledge 
unreliable, reality a myth. Ultimately, these is.5ues tr~d social context 
They touch all human subjects who seek truth, objective or otherwise. The 
Taoist faith, which began in the fourth centuiy B.C., directly confronted the 
problems that today are deemed "modem." 1be central text of Taoism, the 
Te-TaoChing("The Book of the Way and Its Power''), contains these passages: 
The highest virtue is empty like a valley; 
The purest white appears to be soiled; 
Vast virtue appears to be insufficient; 
Firm virtue appears thin and weak; 
The simplest reality appears to change. (p. 9) 
Disaster is that on which good fortune depends. 
Good fortune is that in which disaster's concealed.. 
Who knows where it will end? 
For there is no fixed "correct." 
The "correct'' turns into the "deviant"; 
The "good" turns into "evil." 
People's state of confusion 
Has certainly existed for a long time. (p. 27) 
If the West cannot learn to grow from within its own cultural tradition, it 
perhaps can take a lesson or two from the F.ast. 
. Humanity has little choice but to tend the inextinguishable Promethean 
fire. Yet the question remains whether or not human subjects can succeed in 
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teaching themselves reliable procedures by which they may live safe and 
healthy lives despite the complexity of their historical predicament. The 
question can be best addressed by examining the critical philosophies of two 
of the world's most innovative thinkers -Michel Foucault and Jiirgen 
Habennas. 
The Case of the Bludgeoned Buddha 
When the arsenals of intellectual discourse targeted the frameworks, 
and infrastructures of scientific knowledge, humanity was bluntly told to 
forget the sacred value placed on that knowledge and to focus instead on 
its underlying structures, so as to discover deeper, previously hidden 
truth. F.ager initiates were puzzled to find they could not simply replace 
scientific knowledge with structures and patterns of scientific knowledge as 
their object of worship. The worship of objective reality must itself be 
renounced; omnipotent beings will not descend from on high to rescue us 
from a transitory world, a world of chaos. In the words of Richard Rorty, 
it became necessary to free ourselves from "the notion that outside the 
haphazard and perilous experiments we perform there lies something 
(God, Science, Knowledge, Rationality, or Truth) which will, if only we 
perform the correct rituals, step in to save us" (Consequences of Pragmatism, 
p. 208). We must do as the iconoclasts of old and remove from our lives 
all vestiges of philosophical security, all symbols of a reality beyond 
ourselves. As some Buddhists advised, we must "Kill the Buddha!" 
Themotivationforsucharadicalassaultontraditionalnotionslaidinthe 
belief that these thoughts did nothing except lead us down a garden path, 
toward a blissful dogmatic slumber, and not toward genuine understanding 
or enlightenment. Wisdom, the new priests declare, ronsists in seeing for 
ourselves how circumstance conspired to produce the mer~ appearance of 
wisdom and truth. The man named Siddhartha Gautama, for example, 
discovered a way of responding to the world which proved appropriate for 
him, a way which became widely celebrated and even sanctified due to his 
unique political and historical position. But regardle$of the celebration and 
near-deification, the way of Siddhartha may not in fact prove useful for 
anyone outside of the context in which it was fonned. Granting the status of 
universal truth to his path can only prove repressive-by worshipping the 
Buddha as a figure of absolute truth, the devotee ironically finds only new 
encumbering ties to external circumstance. 
Historicists and ronstructivists - people such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul 
Feyerabend, Michel Foucault, and Richard Rorty- hold that political and 
historical factors determine the structure of societies and their various 
discourses, that ''knowledge" is necessarily defined against this back&:op 
and can only be viewed within a framework of power relationships, which 
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are in fact reinforced by the types of ''knowledge" they produce-an endles.5 
cycle devoid of absolute truth. Scientific theories do not win acceptance 
because they more accurately describe Reality or more greatly contribute to 
Pro~; they win simply by virtue of how power happens to bedistnbuted 
withinasodal context. Thus,Siddhartha'ssanctification wasafunctionofhis 
political position as a wealthy and powerful prince; those who may have 
made similar religious discoveries went unrecognized not because their 
discoveries held le$ intrinsic value, but because of surrounding power 
relations. One can never step outside the network of power relations and 
make perfectly objective evaluations; one can never adequately justify those 
ideas or theories held most evident or most sacred. 'The Buddhist, as well as 
the modem philosopher, longs for exactly such transcendence. 
TheconceptofobjectivityispeculiartotheWesternwo~ldonlyinasmuch 
as it has proven a persistent problem for Western thinkers, burdened with a 
traditionally sharp dichotomy of subject and object. The F.ast followed a far 
more succe$ful approach. For millennia the devotees of F.astem religions 
have conceived of and strove toward a perfect detachment from the world of 
experience, a transcendence to a higher privileged realm, which could afford 
an accurate perspective on the everyday world. 'The West addressed 
objectivity in terms of secular, material existence, a strategy which ultimately 
destined practical endeavors like science and medicine to fierce disputation 
on even the most fundamental epistemic grounds; the F.ast did so in terms of 
re~gion, a strategy which rendered the i$ue from the beginning a matter of 
faith. The West has finally begun to realize that it fought a losing battle 
against itself-that the world we inhabit is not founded on solid epistemic 
ground, thatlong-cherishedassumptionsabouthumanity'sabilitytoobjectify 
not.only phenomena but its own existence were sadly mistaken. Before any 
penod of reconstruction can begll\ the extent and cause of the damage must 
be fully assessed. Though the initial plan of attack proved hopele$, the goal 
of establishing a secure foundation for knowledge and truth is neither absurd 
nor impractical if we can first clear away the unwanted debris of the initial 
plan. 
F romits glorified beginning the West assumed objects existed, and after 
considerable tinkering around with these objects, the idea of objectivity arose 
-the notion of a perfectly amirate perspective upon the arrangement of 
these objects, the notion of "truth." 'The machine-like ·perfection of the 
Western concept of objectivity was derived from the perfection perceived 
and adored in matter. • The concept was doomed to failure as it could not 
~ fo~ to meet the rigorous constraints set for it at its birth. But now that 
" 
5
.particular path (the path of what I will call, for lack of anything better, 
d ob~-rigor") has been abandoned in the West as misguided, we need not 
espairof finding, or more appropriately, constructing other epistemic paths. 
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If anything, hope should be at its highest now, with the freedom to judge the 
errors of the past. 
The primary error was one of putting the cart before the horse; the West 
proceeded from objects and reality and arrived atobFvity, c?nceived of~ 
the perfectly realistic view of reali~, only to find itself precisely _wher~ 1t 
began. However, a very different )Oumey can be. plotted, on~ m which 
humanity, in its current unenlightened state, can amve at a ~gful ~d 
functional sort of objectivity (a sort which not only perf onns well m practice 
butsatisfiespersistentdesiresfortruth),and thenfinallycanproc~ to~ 
claims about reality, about the world of objects and forces we feel exists. This 
journey can not be made by employing all the mechanical and ma~ematical 
rigor of a robotic device. For it is a journey intended for humans, with needs 
and desires. 
Foucault's Plea 
Reacting against the "the new, disciplinary violence that dominates 
modernity" (Habermas, The Phila;ophical Discourse of Modernity p. 245), 
Michel Foucault denounces all fonns of normalization; he regards general 
normative pronouncements as covert violence perpetrated uJ'.X?n h~~ 
subjects. Arbitrary structures embedded in the fabric of soaety inflict 
arbitrary conformity despite pretensions of scientific passivity and 
detachment. To avoid coritnbuting to the probleril, Foucault steadfastly 
refuses to offer any universal solution. His mode of contemplation resembles 
that of the followers of Eastern religion-Foucault is extremely reluctant to 
offer broad direction concerning liberation and enlightenment yet feels that 
both are imperative and strives to attain them. 
F oucaulthaslittledifficulty discussing and demonstrafu:\ghow "regimes 
of truth" function to keep individuals locked within restrictive ideolo~es. 
DisciplineandPunishmakesclearthatFoucaultfindstheprisonanappropnate 
metaphor for man's present and pastcondition-societyis 'carceral' and_ there 
is no outside" (Hoy, p. 138). Apparently positive social forces are inevitably 
used as instruments of coercion-a repressive machine merely becomes more 
efficient when individuals become willing and eager participants in blis.sful 
delusion. David Couzens Hoy offers this interpretation of Discipline and 
Punish: 
78 
The shift from 'atrocious' torture to humane 'correction' may look like increased 
humanitarianism and progressiverecognitionoftheautonomyoftheindivi~~· 
However, Foucault argues that what looks like a new respect for humanity 151 
rather, a more finely tuned mechanism of control of the social body, a more 
effective spinning of the web of power over everyday life. (p. 136) 
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Hoy points out Foucault' sextremereluctance to offer or embrace any system 
that claims to provide positive direction: "Pr~ is not necessarily for the 
better, Foucault intends us to realiz.e, and, indeed, no one welcomes news 
about the progress of a cancer'' (p. 141). While Foucault's skepticism has its 
merits, it falls short of answering the need for a systematic way of identifying 
cancerous tis.5ue from healthy tismie, malignant tumors from benign, as well 
as a way of directing bodies toward a lifestyle most likely to yield a 
cancer-free life. Medical science is capable of offering exactly such direction. 
Foucault is unable to offer a similar direction. 
The strength of Foucault's negative program is such that a positive 
program can hardly get off the ground. Then, too, Foucault has no interest 
or desire to assert such a program, except in the limited form a Buddhist 
would offer: each must find their own path, given their unique circumstances. 
When discussing the way to attain social liberation, Foucault can only offer 
advice at the "micro-level" ;Hoy says that ''his programme need not abandon 
the hope for emancipation, if by that one means the resistance at particular 
points to local exercises of power" (pp. 144-45). Foucault is equally reluctant 
to offer anything other than micro-level ronclusionsaboutwhat direction the 
natural and social sciences should take if their practitioners hope to free 
themselves of the diseases he diagnoses. Foucault demands to examine 
everrpatientand dispense special prescriptionsforeacl\ refusing to endorse 
a uruversal cure, fearing that the disease, or diseases, are so complex that any 
such cure could prove ineffective or counter-productive. Perhaps such 
ca~tio~ is advisable for a Buddhist priest whose followers have not only their 
entire lives but future lives as well to break out of a worldly cycle of rebirth, 
but to a medical practitioner faced with a pandemic that every hour causes 
~rther suffering and death, such excessive caution borders on the 
utesponsible. Approximating impartiality, Foucault refrains from offering 
~r~ptions to all classe5, elite as well as oppressed, leaving each to find a 
fitting cure. Though Foucault wishes to alleviate the suffering of oppressed 
classes, he finds his hands tied by his own anti-political politics. In ternlS of 
Bu~~~m, Foucault's system much more resembles the Hinayana or "small 
vehicle fonn,designed to secure a small number of followers, rather than the 
Mahayana or '1arge vehicle" fonn, aimed at rescuing large groups from 
worldly preoccupations. Foucault's vehicle is designed for individuals, not 
group& . 
like practitioners of E.astern religions, Foucault is often charged with 
advocating a system that refutes its own validity. Because Foucault and 
F.astem religion both assert the idea that truth cannot be known, both face the 
same paradox: how can the idea itself be known to be true? Neither Foucault 
~r Eastern religion claim to voice privileged external Truth-they in fact 
intend their utterances to be encompassed by their skepticism. For any given 
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personinanygivencontext,theutterancesmayormaynotproveappropriate. 
Foucault is willing to admit that 'power' does not even exist, and is eager to 
say that his writings are not offered as absolute truth perceived from some 
privileged position of enlightenment-he is willing to call them fictions. 
(''Interview with Lucette Fmas" p. 175) Buddhism and Taoism both stress 
that the words of its teachers and texts are not to be read as absolute, eternal 
truth. The T~ Tao Ching, composed by the semi-historical figure Lao-Tzu, 
indirectly describes the Tao or "way," yet the very first lines of the work 
provide a clear denial: 
As for the Way, the Way that can be spoken of is not the oonstant Way; 
As for names, the name that can be named is not the constant name. (p. 53) 
Both Foucault and Lao-Tzu invite the appearance of paradox to shake 
readers from their quiet unexamined worlds. Lao-Tzu advises, "Eliminate 
sageliness, throw away knowledge'' (p. 71), yet several chapters earlier he 
asks his readers: 
In cultivating and cleaningyourprofound mirror-can you do it so that 
it has no blemish? 
In loving the people and giving life to the state-can you do it without 
using knowledge? (p. 62) 
Lao-Tzu and Foucault reject the pretensions that inevitably surround and 
permeate knowledge, yet neither want to abandon knowledge-both work 
with it, polishing a mirror that can never be clean. According to David Hoy, 
Foucault sees himself as "mapping the network of power relations that have 
evolved historically'' (p. 128). To do so with the fewest encumbrances, 
Foucault is willing to denytheexistenceof thenetworkorof any map. Hubert 
L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow observe, ''Foucault has been able to diagnose 
our current situation because he shares it He offers us, from the inside, 
pragmatically guided accounts'' (Michel Foucault, p. 2a2). Like the practitioners 
of Eastern religion, Foucault avoids a paradoxical stance by admitting, even 
stres.5ing, that his denials of truth and reality encom~ his own position. 
Foucault differs from Eastern religion in that he cannot adequately 
account for the fact that his work is so unlike the society that surrounds it. In 
a world characteriz.ed by repression and instability, Foucault is an anomaly, 
an unexplained island of stability. Foucault's work "avoids claims to truth 
or seriousness thus exempting itself from instabilities described by the 
theory, whichinitselfmakesitunstable" (DreyfusandRabinow,Mf,p. 98-9). 
Eastern religion can account for its own position by virtue of being a religion, 
and partaking of the nature of a different kind of life, detached from 
transience and chaos. To resolve the issue Foucault faces, one might pasit a 
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religion, or cult, of contemporary critical discourse, though Foucault would 
have sbictly avoided any such move. 
Like a Buddhist or Taoist, Foucault wrestles against -desires, hoping to 
beco~ co~tent with ma~ asceticism, employing exacting self-Oiscipline 
to banishmisbegottendesires,notthroughsuppres&on, but through incisive 
understanding. F.astern religion seeks to banish desires rooted in the 
material world (the "real" world for the West), while cultivating desires for 
transcendencetoanidealstate. Foucault does precisely the opposite-working 
!o grasp reality with perfect objectivity, yet denying the posWility of any 
ideal state. Rather than attaining liberation, Foucault finds enslavement to 
the ~dles.s toil of picking through the rubble of past paths, demonstrating 
that m fact there never were any sound paths (only dangerous illusions 
produced by rep~ive ideology). Foucault's archaeological method, from 
the beginning, strictly avoids assembling any system of analysis, no matter 
oow ~gular the patterns of evidence prove. Conscious of the imperfections 
o~ ~method, Foucault nonethel~ feels that, if pursued with sufficient 
diligence and discipline, it can adequately approximate the actual makeup 
of the landscape. Still, it is less than satisfying for a person hoping to see 
pa~ems. of justice. In his later work, Foucault takes the first step toward 
satisfaction by aiming at objectivity itseH, by seeing that he is part of the 
landscape and that subject/ object dualism pervades all he studies. Yet, for 
all ~e various sbata of debris Foucault explores, he does not succeed at 
cleanng away the issue that prevents full satisfaction. 
Foucault's early historical work struggles to limit itself to a carefully 
d~ta~ed analysis at the micro-level, shying from any system of positive 
direction. Summing up The Archaeology of Knowledge, he writes, 
My aim. was to analyze ... history, in the disrontinuity that no teleology would 
reduce m advance; to map it in a dispersion that no pre-established horizon 
would embrace; to allow it to be deployed in an anonymity on which no 
transcendental constitution would impose the form of the subject; to open it up 
to a temporality that would not promise the return of any dawn. (p. 203) 
Fo~ca~l.t~oosestocultivateanalmostobsessivedesiretoachievearigorous 
0bJeCtivity m his work, at the expense of relinq~g a deep desire to direct 
~oppressed toward liberation. Foucault's early work becomes the perfect 
lustration of the success and failure of critical theory; ... Sociologist Max 
Horkheimer, addressing the inexorable enervation of radical, revolutionary 
mo~ements (Marxism in particular), writes, "Despite all the urgency with 
~~ch theory attempts to illuminate the movement of the social totality even 
m its smallest detail, it is unable to prescribe to individuals an effective fonn 
of resistance to injustice" (p. 116). 
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F oucault'searly work is characterized by an unexamined preference for 
objective analysis. Foucault proposes archaeology asanaptmetapho~ for his 
study of the human sciences assuming that the ~roces.s. of ~venng.the 
fo~ past, unlike the human sciences, can avoid dubious ~terpretation. 
11 Archaeology" is derived from the Greekarchae; the Greeks believed that by 
uncovering the archae, the essential and original substance of the cosmos, 
they would unlock the secrets of the universe. For both Fouca~t and ~ 
Greeks, objective truth is the only pos&ble goal (~) of philosop~cal 
inquiry, yet Foucault carefully restrains his love of wisdo~ by ~g 
that the goal isimpo$ibletoachieve. Foucaultlaterreplaceshisarchaeological 
model with a new model-genealogy-which may be seen as ~ of ~ 
effort to recognize that human subjects necessarily play an essential part m 
any scientific endeavor. The East quickly grasped the dile~ of tros:e who 
seek objective truth; Lao-Tzu writes, "the Sage:/ Puts himself 1n ~e 
background yet finds himself in the foreground;/ Puts self-concern out of his 
mind, yet finds that his self-concern is preserved" (p .. 59~. . . 
Eastern religion teaches its followers (through indirection) that their 
true interests will be realized only when their interests are banished. The best 
way to banish self-interest is not by brute force but by ~g and stealth, 
calmly disarming the beast as it sleeps. After completing his A~charol~, 
Foucault composed a lecture entitled "Orders of Discourse" which begins 
with a frankand disarming admission: ''I wish I could have slipped unnoticed 
into this lecture that I am supposed to be giving today'' (p. 7). Foucault 
intentionally shies away from establishing himself in discourse as a 
self-contained, self-glorified power whose pronouncements may be taken as 
authoritative decrees. ''I don't want to have to enter this risky world of 
discourse· I want nothing to do with it insofar as it is decisive and final; I 
would~ to feel it all around me, calm and transparent, profound, infinitely 
open ... " (Smith trans. p. 215). By subjecting himself to analysis, by freely 
disclosing his desires to slip the bonds of traditio~ authority,. Fo~ca~t 
immobilires the institutional practices that would violate and objectify his 
discussion. 
In his later work Foucault clearly identifies objectivity as the central 
issue of his studies, and others agree. Jiirgen Habennas observed, following 
Foucault's death, that in his work "the stoic attitude of the observer who 
keeps his precise distance, obsessed with obFvity~ ~as~~ined wi~ the 
opposite element of ~ionate self-conswmng pamopation m the reality of 
the historical moment'' (''Taking Aim at the Heart of the ~t'' P· ~03). 
Having wrestled with the duality of subject and object, and having re~ 
that neither pure objectivity nor pure subjectivity are po~ible to. achiev~, 
Foucault fully accepts "the fact that he himself-like any other investigator-~ 
involved in, and to a large extent produced by, the social practices he 15 
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studying'' {Dreyfus and Rabinow, pp. 204, 103). He is inextricably linked 
~th what he stud!es. Yet.by grasping this interrelationship, he can work 
wt~ it and ~m 1t, COl\SCl~us of its dangers to the autonomy of human 
subjects, and msomesense nseabovethefamiliartraps,creatingwhat would 
not be possible otherwise. Foucault writes: 
I am fully aware that I have never written anything other than fictions. For all 
that, I would not want to say they are outside the truth. It seems plausible to me 
to make fictions work within truth, to introduce truth-effects within a fictional 
discourse, and in some way to make discourse arouse, "fabricate," something 
which does not yet exist .... (JLF, p. 175) 
Like a lasting work ofliterature that cannot escape the social context in which 
itwascreated yetstirsreadersacrossculturaland historical barriers, Foucault's 
system of analysis finally emerges not so much as a science, rigorous and 
detached, but as an art, disciplined yet passionately involved. 
I none of his last writings, Foucault states that his plan was not to study 
power: 
Myobjectiveinstead,hasbeento~ahistoryofthedifferentmodesbywhic~ 
in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with ... 
modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects. ('The 
Subject and Power'', p. 208) 
This "objective" is certainly admirable, for it is at the very heart of the crucial 
Pn:>bl~facingtheJ?OStmodem philosopher. Rather than simply approximate 
ob~tivity and reality, Foucault tries to break through subject/ object thought 
tocreatesomething beyond it. Like the Buddhist, Foucault seeks to transcend 
ordinary restrictive positions, not by takingupanmagainsta sea of troubles, 
but by understanding the world as fully as he can. Subduing his desires to 
struggle against the world, Foucault concentrates instead on understanding 
the world's present ''We have only the cultural practices which have made 
us what we are. To know what that is, we have to grapple with the history 
of ~e present'' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 204). Yet, as Jiirgen Habermas 
points out, Foucault's history of the present is aimed not at justifying the 
~resent but rather at shedding "modernity's presentist consciousn~ of 
time" (PDM, p. 249). Focusing exclusively on practices, rejecting theory as 
so much wishful thinking, Foucault hopes to arrive at a new, lucid 
understanding of the present. 
The Case Restated: Representation versus Agreement 
11 
Richard Rorty poin~ out the confusion over the word "objective," to 
mean both .. characterizing the view which would be agreed upon asa result 
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of argument undeflected by irrelevant considerations' and 'representing 
things as they really are" (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , pp. 333-4). 
Foucault rejects the idea of universal agreement as impossible, undesirable, 
and dangerous. Believing t}:lat any sort of general agreement or formation of 
nonns can only produce disastrous subjugatio~ Foucault accepts only the 
second definition. Even though, like the Buddhist, he fundamentally opposes 
describing absolute reality with anything other than negative assertions or 
micro-level positive assertions, he is after all still describing reality, at least as 
perceived by humans, or at least one pas&onately involved human, perhaps 
somewhat accurately, perhaps not. Foucault takes such a heavily qualified 
and cautiousapproachbecause he accepts theidea that the severe mechanistic 
rigor associated with static inanimate objects is appropriate for evaluating 
abstract ideas fonned by human minds. Any system of ideas, if forced to bear 
unreasonable burdens of proof, will collapse. The rules of any game may be 
set so that no one wins. There is no telling what Foucault might have created 
and constructed if he could have fully dismantled object-rigor. Certainly he 
would not have rejected his desire for a positiveprogr~ for such p~ 
are not impossible to construct if one ceases to demand absolute rigor. He 
might have even reronsidered his aversion for rational agreement, for if it is 
not rigorously interpreted it can function, and if it is not applied with 
unyielding rigor it can function fairly. 
I n his examination of the critical theory of Habennas, Raymond~ 
touches on the burden of object-rigor: 
The positivists would have said that neither legitimizing world-pictureS nor 
critical theories can be true or false. Perhaps they were wrong only to draw from 
this the conclusion that · world-pictures and critical theories are therefore 
meaningl~ and that there is no way to rationally decide between thelllt that 
any choice is a mere preference. Why accept the alternative: Science or mere, 
brute preference? (p. 94) 
Foucault, however, accepts the alternative. Though he does not d~ 
anything meaningles.5, Foucault otherwise conceives of the problem m 
all-or-nothingtenns:ideally,researcherswouldbeabletoevaluatephenomena 
with rigorous algorithms, With an infallible truth detector, with a perfectly 
reliable scientific machine, as conceived by many in the nineteenth century. 
Drawn to this ideal, yet offended by its absurdity, Foucault doubts wh~ 
any genuinely reliable form of science is po~ible. He goesasfar as to question 
the validity ofhumandesiresfortruth, infiltrated by the will to power,aswell 
as by arbitrary practical contingencies. According to Fo~c.ault, "we~ 
unaware of the prodigious machinery of the will to truth, with its vocation 
of exclusion" (DL, p. 220). Foucault believes that the 
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will to trut~ like ... other systems of exclusion, relies on institutional support 
it is both reinforced and accompanied by whole strata of practices such as 
pedagogy-naturally-the book-system, publishing, libraries, such as the learned 
societies in the past, and laboratories today. But it is probably even more 
profoundly accompanied by the manner in which knowledge is employed in 
a society, thewayin which it is expJoited,divided and, in some ways, attnbuted. 
(DL, p. 219) 
By applying rigorous constraints to truth and the human desire for truth, 
Foucault causes both to disappear in the final analysis: 
Now I believe the problem does not oonsist in drawing the line between that in 
a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or trut~ and that 
which romes under some other category, but in seeing historically how effects 
of truth are produced within discourses which are in themselves neither true 
nor false. ("fruth and Power", p. 118) 
Foucault' smethod nevertheless bears the marks of the forces he tries to shun. 
Fou~ult analym» history and society in close, exacting detail, affirming the 
reality of the landscape he explores, even as he denies its hold on him, denies 
its ~eryexistence. Unlike the Buddhist, Foucault never directly oonfronts his 
desire for truth and reality, never fully estimates its power, and therefore 
never succeeds in freeing himself from it, despite fancying that he has risen 
above the entire conflict 
Without the ability to distinguish between science and pseudoscience, 
stu?ying only the history of particular fonns of each, we fall into a dilemma 
which can only lead toa very biz.arre fonn of science which would encourage 
practi?oners to anticipate future rewritings of history bf indiscriminately 
attacking trusted notions. Scientists would suddenly bea>me like Wilhelm 
Ostwald who at the tum of the twentieth century tried to de<Dnstruct notions 
of matter and a physical universe in order to clear the way for something 
co~pletely different called "energetics." Though Ostwald made a good 
pom~ about the West's peculiar preoccupation with matter, his plan did 
nothing to aid the actual perfonnance of science. 
. Foucault chooses not to address the future positive direction of human 
~t~ce because it cannot be done with certainty, thus rendering any 
m:ection merely arbitrary, chauvinistic, and dangerous. As he vehemently 
~all fonns of nonnalization, any system that will universally prescribe 
or impose agreed-upon standards or rules upon individuals, Foucault feels 
~trongaversion for judicial syste~. Specifically, Foucault despises the fact 
. t co~ pretend to have a~ to pure subjectivity or universality when 
in fact sen~us divisions exist between the judge and the judged (and even 
among the JUdged); at the same time, courts claim access to pure objectivity 
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or detachment when in fact the judge is always to some extent involved in the 
proceedings, especially in seeing that the structure of the court is sustained, 
and the judge's own position of god-like power unthreatened. Foucault's 
stand against both types of pretension is evident in his discus.5ion with 
Maoists: 
The necessity that unity be affirmed does not have to take the form of a court. 
I would even say-though perhaps the analogy is a bit strained-that the rourt 
sets up again a kind of division of labour. There are those who judge-<>r who 
pretend to judge-with total tranquility, without being in any way involved. 
This re-inforces the idea that for judicial proceedings to be just they must be 
conducted by someone who can remain quite detached, by an intellectual, an 
expert in the realm of ideas. ~ into the bargain, the people's court is 
organised or presided over by intellectuals, who romealong to hear what on the 
one hand the workers and what on the other hand the bosses have got to say, 
and to pronounce: This one is innocent, that one guilty', then the whole thing 
is infused with idealism. When it romes to proposing this as a general model 
of what popular justice should be like, I'm afraid the worst possible model has 
been chosen. ("On Popular Justice", p. 30) 
Foucault's fiercest antipathy is for the pretension of pure objectivity by a 
individual or institution of great power. All individuals must realize that 
they are trapped on the inside, and must be wary of the danger inherent in 
letting anyone assume they can hold an outside stance. In the words of 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault "advises intellectuals to abandon their 
universal prophetic voice. He urges them to drop their pretensions about 
predicting the future and, even more, their self-proclaimed legislative role" 
(MF, P· 202). 
By "vigorously opposing justifications .. . in terms of religion, law, 
science or philosophical grounding" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, ''What is 
Maturity?'', p . 121), Foucault leaves unresolved and unapproached the 
question of how to distinguish the most productive areas of the natural and 
social sciences from the worst horrors of humanity's history. Even those 
critics most sympathetic to Foucault articulate this concern. Dreyfus and 
Rabinowfeel thatweneed "togobeyondFoucaultinrhetoricallystrengthening 
the post-enlightenment practices that are positive, such as many of our 
technological, legal, and medical advantages" (WIM, p. 121). They also feel 
that Foucault needs to offer some positive description of his program, even 
if it is only a broad rough sketch. 
86 
Foucault's ascetic refusal to go beyond his roncrete demonstrations, while 
consistent and even admirable, does not make the questions disappear; nor 
does it fully satisfy our perhaps traditional desire to have a picture of the rourse 
. . . [the one he steers between] a return to the traditional philosophic view that 
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descriptions and interpretation ultimately must rorrespond to the way things 
really are, and a nihilist view that physical reality, the body, and history are 
whatever we ta1ce th~ to be. (MF, p. 205) 
I twould certainly seem possible toconceiveof a court different from the 
type Foucault imagines and fears, a court free from those faults he decries. A 
~dgewho~asawareofho~she~asinextricablyperhapseven pas&onately 
mvolvoo with what she was JUdgmg, who did not presume an outside stance 
to ~oice judgments with absolute truth, who grasped the network with 
which she was a part, w~ offered only pragmatic conclusions, who judged 
each case on its particular merits, who understood that absolute universality 
of ~greement was not pC>$ible to achieve in practice, and certainly not 
d~rrable to ~orce, and who could only exercise direct power over her own 
actions, deasions, thoughts, beliefs, etc.-such a judge would be one to 
whomFoucaultcouldnotobject. Suchajudgewouldinfactgreatlyresemble 
Fouc:ault working as a historian of society, trying to und~tand as fully as 
possible the complex entanglement of the world and his place in it, and trying 
ther~y to rise ~v~ it, to create something better through his own careful, 
sel~ve, evaluativeJUdgment. This is all thatisnecessarytostartassembling 
a picture of the. court. Foucault, burdened with the notion of object-rigor, 
wo~d have resISted any attempt to describe his work as like that of a judge, 
but if he had abandoned that burden he might have been able to see himself 
as s~ch, by freely constructing a model that corresponded to his beliefs and 
desrres about how to go about intellectual endeavor. 
The Western concept of law, like the concept of objectivity, has suffered 
a long and tortured history due to the unrealistic demands placed upon it as 
~fixed absolute. Eastern religion, however, offers a more fluid counterpart 
m ''Dhanna," the Law of Righteo~ revered by Mahayanists. Quoting 
fro.m Mahayana texts, William Theodore de Bary observes "the mystical 
attitude toward Dharma, which was widespread in later Buddhism. Here 
Dhanna seems to have much in common with the Tao of Lao-Tzu": 
'f?e blessed Buddhas, of virtues endl~ and limitless, are born of the Law of 
Righteousness; they dwell in the Law, are fashioned by the Law; they have the 
Law as their master, the Law as their light, the Law as their field of action the 
Law as their refuge. (p. 102) ' 
Unlike law in the West, Dharma is unfixed and inexpressible, much like the 
Tao: Both Eastern conceptions emphasize the importance of justice within 
soaety and within individuals. 
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The Law has no regard for the pleasant. Impartial is the Law. 
So must I make my thought like the Law. 
The Law is not dependent upon time. Timeless is the Law ... 
So must I make my thought like the Law. (p.102) 
Impartiality and timelessness are central to both Dhannaand the Tao, which 
both provide "maps'' for humans to follow, though neither map can be said 
to exist. 
Habermas's Plea 
J iirgen Habermas offers a positive program that Foucault himseH 
might have endorsed, had he been able to break the shackles of object-rigor. 
Habermas can be read as trying to end intellectual incarceration; he writes, 
"As long as Occidental self-understanding views human beings as 
distinguished in their relationship to the world by their monopoly on 
encountering entities, knowing and dealing with objects ... reason remains 
confined ... " (PDM, p. 311)~ Foucault, along with many others, has objected 
toHabermas'sprogram,yettheseobjectionsarelaunchedfromaperspective 
of realistic rigor which mistakes the program for an algorithmic mechanical 
device, though Habennas offers the program only as a picture of the general 
courseindividualsand society should take in establishing new ground, as the 
home for the hard-won fruits of their past productive labor and the site for 
future useful work. 
I nordertoconstructasystemcapableof evaluativejudgments,HabemlaS 
addresses objectivity as agreement Habermas puts forward the notion of the 
ideal speech situation, in which agents are fully free and autonomous, are not 
subject to any form of coercion, and are not constrained by external factors, 
including time. The beliefs and general interests agreed upon in the ideal 
speech situation will be those vital to the group. From that agreement we can 
proceed to judge what systems or conditions best fulfill the interests of the 
group, what the group should strive toward, as well as what is appropriate 
forittojudgeas reality or tnith. Dreyfus and Rabinow say Habermas "claims 
that a pre-critical attempt to offer a metaphysical grounding can be replaced 
with an analysis of the conditions in which the ideal speech community 
presupposed in all uses of language can be realired" (WIM, p. 110). 
Foucault rejects the ideal speech situation as a pointless and dangerous 
postulate. As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, Foucault is offended by the 
idea of a "universal imperative implicit in all speech acts." (WIM, p. 119) 
Foucault writes, 'The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone 
in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it seems catastrophic to 
me" (Cited in WIM, p. 119). Yet the findin~ obtained through the ideal 
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~situation need not and in fact are not intended to be applied with an 
rron-fisted rigor, either by individuals or societies. 
~ abermas' ~con~ with the ability to differentiate appropriate paths 
from~ppropnateonesJSfounded onadesiretoseegreatersocial liberation, 
a desire Foucault shares. Habermas offers a more satisfying solution to a 
need for clear direction, whichisanespeciallydesperateneed in an incredibly 
fast-paced world. 
!he direction o~ technical progress is still largely determined today by social 
interests that anse autochthonously out of the oompulsion of the reproduction 
of social life without being reflected upon and confronted with the declared 
politic:a:1 self-understanding of social groups. In oonsequence, new technical 
capaaties erupt without preparation into existing forms of life-activity and 
conduct. New potentials for expanded power of technical control make 
obvious the disproportion between the result of the most organi7.ed rationality 
and ~ected goals, rigidified value-systems, and obsolete ideologies. (Toward 
a Rational Society, p. 60) 
Thechaos:oucault~ t~adv~~couldindeed provefarmoredangerous 
~ offenng a clear guiding direction, even one which would be at best 
un~ect and only approximate. A course of free, discursive, rational 
analysJS of the most effective ways to fulfill people's needs and interests 
~ould ~many ways be far more preferable to no clear positive course. To 
his credit, Habermas's system works fairly well in diagnosing what is 
appropriate and inapprqpriate, though perhaps not if viewed from the 
perspective of critics who have not yet abandoned object-rigor. 
R.a~nd Geu~ describes how Habermas's critical theory works in 
conceiving the necessity of evaluating positive and productive ideologies: 
Participating in a culture is a way of satisfying certain very deep-seated huinan 
needs. Humans have a vital need for the kind of 'meaningful' life and the kind 
ofidentitywhichispossibleonlyforanagentwhostandsinrelationtoaculture. 
Traditional religio.us world-views owe their persistence to their ability to meet 
some of these basic needs. They do this by providing agents with approved 
mod~ls of action, ~oals, ~deals, and values, and by furnishing interpretations of 
su~ unportant .existential features of human life as birth and death, suffering, 
eviL etc. Starting, the!\ from the wants, needs, interests, and the objective 
situatio~ of a giv~ human group, we can set ourselves the task of determining 
what kind of S0C1o-cultural system or what world-view would be most 
appropriate for that group, i.e. what 'ideology' ... is most likely to enable the 
members of the group to satisfy their wants and needs and further their 
interests. (p. 22) 
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A scientific ideology might be judged useful by rontributing to the needs of 
the various members of a society. The most appropriate scientific ideology 
would be that which performed the best job practically and epistemically. 
Specific practical and epistemic virtues would be arrived at through the use 
of the ideal speech situation. Thomas McCarthy feels that Habermas's 
program could 
defend the directionality of the history of science against relativistic 
interpretations ... [he could] point for support to the capacity for prediction and 
technological control, which despite often discontinuous conceptual shifts, has 
undergone continued expansion. Well~blished empirical regularities may 
be repeatedly refined and reconceptualizai, but they are not simply dropped; 
we do not dismantle bridges or bombs when theories change. (p. 61) 
While Foucault offers no systematic acrount of how technology and science 
can dependably work to humanity'sbenefit,Habermasoffersa program that 
can directly acknowledge. the neces.sity of eval~ating science against 
pseudoscience and against the needs of society. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow sum up Habermas's position when they observe 
that for Habermas 
the problem of modernity consists in preserving the primacy of reason ... while 
facing up to the loss of metaphysical ground of our substantive beliefs. 
Maturity is the discovery of the quasi-transcendental basis of community as all 
we have and all we need, for philosophy, and human dignity. . . . Maturity 
consists in clarifying the form social organiutions talce in a given epoch, 
judging their adequacy for promoting human community, and assuming 
responsibility both for the way they are and for making them more adequate. 
(WIM, p. 111) 
Though Foucault shared Habennas' s impulse toward helping society better 
itself, he shunned any formulation, refusing to take any responsibility for 
anyoneotherthanhimself,and refusingtoconfessa desire for transcendence. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow speculate that while "what makes one interpretive 
theory better than another [for Foucault] ... has yet to be worked out ... it has 
to do with articulating common concerns and finding a language which 
becomes accepted as a way of talking about social situations" (WIM, p. 115). 
They emphasize, though, that Foucault would like to leave "open the 
possibility of "dialogue,' or better, a conflict of interpretations, with other 
shared discursive practices.used to articulate different concerns" (WlM, P· 
115). Certainly Habermas would not object to allowing or encouraging the 
existence of dissenting viewpoints during or after the process of arriving 
at agreement regarding common concerns and an appropriate language. 
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Habermas is intent on promoting the greatest possible freedom, not 
inhibiting it · 
A New Jurisprudence: The Union of 
Agreement and Representation 
F oranyonefreetochoosebetweentheprogramsFoucaultandHabermas 
offer, the choice should be fairly dear. While Foucault fonnally precludes 
satisfactio~ Habermasopensnewpathscapableof leadinghumanity, for the 
wide range of its endeavors, in whichever direction it desires. Of course, 
Foucault is not entirely misguided or off-track, nor is Habennas the most 
enlightened being capable of existence. Thoughachoicecannotbealgoritmnic, 
it can nonethel~ be rationally made. Raymond Geus.s says, 
Agents can act in ways that are more or less enlightened; the freedom of 
communication and discussion they enjoy and their freedom to form and 
acquire beliefs and p~ces is a matter of degree; agents can be more or less 
reflective. To what extent a critical theoiy is enlightening and emandpatoiy 
may then equally be a matter of degree. H rational argumentation can lead to 
the conclusion that a critical theoiy represents the most advanced position of 
ronsciousness available to us in our given historical situation, why the obsession 
with whether or not we may call it true? (p. 94) 
Habermas recognizes that agents naturally affirm the truth of their beliefs 
and the reality of the wor~d, and derive satisfactio~ from doing so. Ideally, 
agents should be free to admit that they might be mistaken, that even the 
beliefs founded in the best pos.51ble cimunstances might yet be wrong, that 
their affinnations are only approximations that hold for a given group in a 
given time. 
Though thetenninologyisnew, the fundamental problems and solutions 
are not the unique product of the last few decades. In a 1934 essay entitled 
'Written History as an Act of Faith," historian Charles A. Beard anticipates 
the dilemma posed by the constructivists decades later and offers clear 
advice on how it might be resolved. He puts forward a view of science that 
both Habermas and Foucault could agree upon: 
The inquiring spirit of science ... is the chief safeguard against the tyranny of 
authority, bureaucracy, and brute power. It can reveal by investigation 
necessities and possibilities in any social scene and also offerings with respect 
to desirabilities to be ~chieved within the limits of the ~ible. . . [It] is, 
therefore, a precious and indispensable instrument of the human mind. . . . It 
is when this ... child of the human brain is exalted into a master and a tyrant 
that historical thought must enter a caveat. So the historian is bound by his craft 
to recogni7.e the nature and limitations of the scientific method and to dispel the 
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illusionthatitcanproduceascienceofhistoryembracingthefullnessofhistory, 
or of any large phase, as past actuality. (p. 149) 
Beard would not advocate breaking statues of the Buddha if they were 
recognized for what they were-helpful tools created by human hands, not 
in themselves holy or part of some greater reality. Beard identifies the 
intellectual crisisof themodernage, whichhefeelscontainsitsownresolution. 
It is almost a confession of inexpiable sin to admit in academic circles that one 
is not a man of science working in a scientific manner with things open to 
deterministic and inexorable treatment, to admit that one is more or less a 
guesser in a vale of tears. (p. 143) 
To resolve these feelings of guilt, the historian need only recognize the falsity 
of rigorous scientific conceptions of the historian's task-the historian need 
only realize that the job is from the start a matter of faith: "The historian ... 
consciously or unconsciously perfonns an act of faith, as to order and 
movement, for certainty to order and movement is denied to him by 
knowledge of the actuality with which he is concerned" (p. 148). Beard 
speaks not only of the impossibility of getting at things as they really are 
("past actuality'') but of the necessaiy and unavoidable subjectivity of the 
observer who has no choice but to operate within his or her own frame of 
reference. Beard says that in the face of this dilemma historians should not 
only fully revise their rigorous conception of the intent and purpose of their 
endeavors but, in light of this new end, should faithfully 
proceed to examine his own frame of reference, clarify it, enlarge it by acquiring 
knowledge of greater areas of thought and events, and give it consistency of 
structure by a deliberate conjecture respecting the nature or direction of ... ideas 
and interests. (p. 150) 
Habermas and Foucault could both support this drive to greater 
self-awareness. In 1900, physicist Henri Poincare advocated such 
self-examination as the solution for scientists seeking to arrive at genuine 
freedom and understanding. 
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It is often said that we must experiment with no preconceived idea. That 
is not possible ... even if we wanted to do so, it could not be done. Everyone 
has within [them their] idea of the world, which cannot be so easily put aside. 
For example, we have to make use of language, which is made up ne:essarlly 
of preconceived ideas. Such ideas unconsciously held are the most dangerous 
of all. 
Shall we say that if we cause to intervene others of which we have full 
consciousness, weshallbutaggravatetheevil? ldonotthinkso;Ibelieverather 
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!hat they will act as mutual counterweights, I was going to say antidotes, that 
mgeneral will accord poorly and evenconflictwitheachother forcing us to look 
at things from different aspects. This is enough to free us: [anyone] who can 
choose [their] master is no longer a slave. (p. 403) 
Poincare's scheme of perpetual conflict would win warm support from 
Foucault, yet Foucault would not have brought himself to nearly so bold a 
statement Poincare) was very much in favor of rerognizing ideas as ideas 
and recognizing that they may indeed be "useful to give satisfaction to the 
mind" (p. 416). H Foucault may be likened to Hinayana Buddhi~ both 
Habermas and Poincare) may be compared with the Mahayana school. To 
illustrate the idealism of Mahayana thought, William de Bary quotes directly 
from a Mahayana text: 
All phenomena originate in the mind, and when the mind is fully known all 
phenomena are fully known. For by the mind .the world is led. . . . The 
bodhisattva, thoroughly examining the nature of things, dwells in everpresent 
mindfulness of the activity of the mind, and so he does not fall into the mind's 
power, but the mind comes under his a>ntrol. And with the mind under his 
control, all phenomena are under his a>ntroL (p. 100) 
To sum up, we should notgoaboutsmashingstatuesof the Buddha. We 
should simply see them for what they are. In fact, we Should build new 
statues with forms and features different from previous rigid conceptions. 
We should neither say with Ostwald, 1'Thou shalt make unto thee no mental 
image or likeness whatsoever/' nor with Ludwig Boltzmann, 1Thou shalt 
~veto such images the fewest pos.sible arbitrary features" (pp. 358-9), but 
instead: Thou shalt give tosuchimagesfeatures that best suit human interests 
~given ~deavors, reaJizing that though these features are indeed arbitrary 
(m the strict etymological sense) they are not merely arbitrary and certainly 
not without value and PUIJX>Se· We should follow a path prescribed by Pierre 
Duhan, a path favoring the lucidity and vigilanre of Foucault and the 
positive and non-rigorously systematic judgment of Habermas: 
Since logic does not determine with strict precision the timewhenan inadequate 
h)f'Othesis should givewaytoa more fruitful assumption, and since recognizing 
~his moment belongs to good sense, physicists may hasten this judgement and 
mcrease the rapidity of scientific progress by trying consciously to make good 
sense within them.selves more lucid and more vigjlant. . . We are thus led to 
theconclusionsoclearlyexpressed byOaude Bernard: The sound experimental 
aiticism of a hypothesis is subordinated to certain moral conditions; in order 
to estimate corTeCtly the agreement of a physical theory with the facts, it is not 
enough to be a good mathematician and skillful experimenter; one must also be 
an impartial and faithful judge. (p. 218) 
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Notes 
9Note: Enlightenment philosophy helped propagate the notion that the mind 
simply Nmirrored" the physical world, that Nobject:sw of the mind are directly and 
uniformly produced by objects in the world. In John Locke's surprisingly elaborate 
and archaic psychological schema, activities of the mind are neatly 
compartmentaliud, the tidiest classification being that of simpleideas. For Locke, 
simple ideas, produced directly by physical sensations, are like building blocks, 
indivisible atoms that could be combined to form molecular complex ideas. The 
"objects" of simple ideas include all the properties of matter (yellow, cold, hard, etc.) 
Foucault successfully attacks the notion of neutral simple ideas, yet does not succeed 
in divorcing the concept of objectivity from its origins, from the rigorous periecti<>n 
of "object-thinking.# 
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